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No Constitutional Shelter: The Ninth
Circuit's Reading of the Hybrid Claims
Doctrine in American Friends Service
Committee Corp. v. Thornburgh 1
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason
and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men
are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according
to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of
all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other. 2

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1990 the Supreme Court decided the case of Employment Division v. Smith. 3 There it held, "[I]f prohibiting the
exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the [tax or regulation] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not
been offended."4 The Court appeared to qualify this surprising5 and controversial 6 rule by admitting that it had struck
down generally-applicable legislation on the basis of the Free
Exercise Clause 7 in some "hybrid situation[s],"8 when the free
exercise claim had been asserted "in conjunction with other

1.
961 F.2d 140fi (9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion).
THE VIRGINIA BILL OF RIGHTS (1776), reprinted in SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS
2.
lLLUSTRATIN!i THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788 AND THE FoRMATION OF THE
FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION 1fi1 (Samuel Eliot Morison ed., 2d ed. 1965).
::L
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4.
!d. at H7R.
fi.
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1.
"The Court sharply changed existing law without an opportunity for briefing or
argument, and it issued an opinion claiming that its new rules had been the law
for a hundred years." !d.
6.
E.g, Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1109-11 (1990).
7.
494 U.S. at 881.
8.
!d. at RH2.
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constitutional protections."9 The principle on which the Court
said that it relied in such cases will be referred to as the hybrid
claims doctrine.
This note examines the hybrid claims doctrine as recently
applied by the Ninth Circuit in a case where a Quaker organization asserted a free exercise claim against the federal government: American Friends Service Committee Corp. v. Thornburgh. 10 A careful reading of Thornburgh suggests that the
hybrid claims doctrine provides no genuine exception to the
core holding of Smith.

II. THE SMITH DECISION AND How IT
CHANGED FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
A.

Where We Came From: The Sherbert Balancing Test

The Constitution declares, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." 11 In other words, the Free Exercise Clause
protects freedom of religion by prohibiting Congress from passing laws that interfere with religious practice. On its own
terms, the Free Exercise Clause applies only to congressional
legislation. The Supreme Court, however, has extended the
scope of the Free Exercise Clause to cover actions by state
governments. 12 This means the Court makes no distinction
between federal and state action for purposes of Free Exercise
inquiry. 13
Beginning with Sherbert v. Verner, 14 the Supreme Court
evaluated Free Exercise Clause challenges according to a balancing test. 15 Justice O'Connor stated that test in the following terms: "[T]he government [must] justify any substantial
burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state
interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."16 On one side of the scales lay the burden to religious
9.
10.
11.
12.
18.
14.
Hi.
16.

ld. at RlH.
961 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, :no U.S. 296, 803 (1940).

Id.
874 U.S. 898 (1963).

ld. at

40:~.

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concur-
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practice caused by government action. On the other side lay the
government's interest in pursuing that action. In practice, the
Sherbert test gave religious freedom a less effective shield than
it first appeared to construct. "The Court generally found either
that the free exercise right was not burdened or that the government interest was compelling." 17 Despite this trend in the
high Court, religious practice received benefit from the Sherbert
test. ''There were many more applications of the doctrine in the
state and lower federal courts, and legislatures and executive
bodies frequently conformed their decisions to its dictates." 18
From 1963 until 1989 the Court continued to apply the
Sherbert test, 19 thus bolstering its strength by reconfirming its
authority. In 1990, however, the Court eviscerated whatever
protection the Sherbert test offered religious practice. 20
B.

Where We Are Now: The Smith Decision

1.

Smith's core holding

In Smith the Court reinterpreted the Free Exercise Clause
to mean that government needs to show only that its statute
does not specifically target a religious practice. 21 As long as a
regulation treats religious interests the same as every other
interest, the Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause not to
require governments to accommodate a religious practice that
otherwise runs afoul of the statute. 22 With a few narrow and
ill-defined exceptions, 23 this holding forms the general rule
ring) (citations omitted).
17.
McConnell, supra note 5, at 1110.
1R.
ld.
19.
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 6RO, 699 (1989) ("The free exercise
inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden.") (citations omitted); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("The essence of all that has been said and written on
the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.");
Sherbert v. Verner, ::l74 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) ("(A]ny incidental burden on the free
exercise of [a person's] religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest in
the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate.'")
(citations omitted).
20.
See Laycock, supra note 4, at 4 ("[T]he Free Exercise Clause itself now
[after Smith] has little independent substantive content.")
21.
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
ld. at 878-79.
22.
23.
For a discussion of these exceptions and their contours, see Laycock, supra
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that now defines the scope of personal rights protected by the
Free Exercise Clause. 24

2.

The hybrid claims doctrine

a. The language of the Smith opinion.
To reach its
conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause requires only that
laws not directly target religious practice, 25 the Court had to
overcome a significant obstacle. Sherbert and some of its progeny suggest that the First Amendment required greater deference toward religious practice than mere facial neutrality. 26
Those cases suggest instead that the Sherbert balancing test
imposed on government an affirmative duty to avoid burdening
religious practice. 27 In Smith the Court characterized this precedent in the following passage.
The only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as
freedom of speech and of the press. 28

This description of precedent in terms of a novel doctrine29 creates ambiguities.

b.

Two alternative readings.

The hybrid claims doctrine is an attempt to
distinguish contrary precedent. 30 Because the cases cited to
( 1)

note 4, at 39·54.
See American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405,
24.
1407 (1992) (amended opinion).
25.
See 494 U.S. at R78.
26.
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 21fi (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 39R, 403 (1963).
Id.
27.
2R.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881, citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, :n9 U.S. 105
(1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, :no U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940); and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
29.
Laycock, supra note 4, at 1.
:;o. McConnell, supra note 5, at 1121-22; see infra note 36 and accompanying
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this poine 1 contradict the rule enunciated in Smith, the
Smith Court had to somehow distinguish them. One leading
commentator adopts this reading and suggests that the Smith
Court articulated the hybrid claims doctrine "for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder in this case."32
Precedents can also be overruled sub rosa, which may be
what happened in Smith. Compare, for example, Wisconsin v.
Yoder 33 with Smith. In Yoder the Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause barred Wisconsin from applying its compulsory
school attendance statute against members of the Old Order
Amish religion, whose religious tenets required them to remove
their children from public schools after the eighth grade. 34 As
part of its reasoning the Court addressed the issue of facial
neutrality. "A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of
religion."35 Compare this language with the Smith holding,
which permits legislation to burden religion so long as that
effect is not the express purpose of the legislature. 36 Whatever
its explicit treatment of precedent, the Court makes it clear
that the balancing test of Sherbert and the high protection afforded free exercise claims expressed in Yoder have been mostly replaced by judicial deference to legislative decisionmaking.37
(2) The hybrid claims doctrine is an exception to the core
holding of Smith. The passage from Smith could mean that a
court should apply the general rule unless a plaintiff can show
that her free exercise claim is accompanied by another consti-

text.
31.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. ?115, 234 (1972); Follett v. McCormick, 321
U.S. 573, 577 (1944); Murdock v. Penn;:;ylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112-13, 117 (1943);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940); and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
32.
See McConnell, supra note 5, at 1121.
33.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
34.
ld. at 234.
ld. at 220.
35.
:!6.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
37.
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
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tutional claim. 38 This interpretation could lead in two possible
directions.
Lower courts might read the hybrid claims doctrine to
reduce the number of enforced free exercise claims by requiring
every free exercise claim to be coupled with another constitutional claim. This would force plaintiffs to couch their free
exercise claims in terms of hybrid claims, on the assumption
that combining claims would result in an enforceable constitutional claim. This idea of getting more out of a free exercise
claim combined with another constitutional claim than one
could get by asserting the free exercise claim alone has been
compared by one commentator to Hamburger Helper. 39
Read expansively, the hybrid claims doctrine might also
increase the number of successful constitutional claims by
allowing constitutional claims of doubtful strength to be invigorated through hybridization. On this reading, the hybrid claims
doctrine makes the Free Exercise Clause a kind of super-vitamin to invigorate otherwise feeble constitutional claims.

Criticism of both readings of the hybrid
claims doctrine.
c.

(1) The hybrid claims doctrine fails to distinguish Yoder.
The Smith holding simply contradicts Yoder. 40 Given that contradiction, the Court in Smith probably could not have logically
reached its holding without overruling Yoder. If so, the hybrid
claims doctrine may not be capable of accomplishing what it

3R.
See American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405,
1409 (9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion). Here the plaintiffs assert a free exercise
claim coupled with a claim based on the "right to employ" and argue that this
hybrid falls within "the exception for 'hybrid claims.'" !d.
39.
James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91,
98 n.49 (1991).
40.
Dompare Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) ("[Our] decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes [or prescribes] conduct that his
religion prescribes [or proscribes].'") (quoting United States v. Lee, 45fi U.S. 252,
263, n.3 (1982)) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 220 (1972) ("A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it
unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.") (citations omitted). This comparison
emphasizes a point I made earlier. Supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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was invented to do. In light of its characterization of precedent
quoted above, the Court in Smith appears not to have treated
Yoder as controlling precedent, which it had an obligation to
distinguish from the instant case. Rather, as one commentator
boldly states, "[T]he Court's account of its precedents in Smith
is transparently dishonest."41 Because the Smith Court treated Yoder disingenuously the hybrid claims doctrine can be read
as a failed attempt to distinguish contrary precedent.
(2) Does the hybrid claims doctrine provide a genuine exception to the core holding of Smith? Neither reading of the hybrid claims doctrine as a genuine exception to Smith is plausible. The restrictive reading transforms the Free Exercise
Clause into a jurisprudential zero having no constitutional
gravity of its own. The Smith holding had that effect already.42 If that's the entirety of the hybrid claims doctrine,
then it has no substantive content beyond the meaning of the
holding. The expansive reading swallows the general rule of
Smith. If every feeble constitutional claim can receive new life
merely by association with a free exercise claim, then Smith
means nothing at all. 43
At the writing of Smith, the precise boundaries of its holding were unclear and remained to be worked out in future
cases. 44 Part of that process of clarification has focused on the
hybrid claims doctrine. As with most new rules, its meaning
becomes clear only after application in the courts. The Ninth
Circuit recently applied the hybrid claims doctrine in American
Friends Service Committee Corp. v. Thornburgh. 45

41.
Laycock, wpra note 4, at 2 (citations omitted).
42.
ld. at 4.
43.
See infra note R5 and accompanying text.
44.
See Laycock, supra note 4, at 9. "[A]lthough the Court distorted the rationale of its precedents beyond recognition, the exceptions and limitations to its new
principle preserved all its prior results. We may be told in the next case that
these results were really undermined by Smith and they must now be overruled
after all . . . . Part of the task in future cases is to search for principled lines
between what the Court has preserved and what it has rejected." ld. Among these
"exceptions and limitations" is the hybrid claims doctrine.
45.
961 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion).
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THE THORNBURGH LITIGATION

A.

Underlying Facts

1.

The history of the litigation

In 1989, the American Friends Service Committee
(AFSC) and some of its members sued the Attorney General,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the United
States. 46 AFSC challenged the provisions of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (I.R.C.A.), 47 which require an
employer to verify employees' immigration status and not to
employ or continue to employ any person who is not authorized
to work in the United States. 48 Failure to comply with these
provisions subjects an employer to civil penalties of up to
$10,000 for each violation49 and criminal penalties of up to six
months imprisonment. 50
The plaintiffs conceded that they had not complied with
I.R.C.A. since its effective date. 51 In support of their actions,
they argued that complying with I.R.C.A. would violate their
religious beliefs. Quakers believe that all human beings are
equal and that they have a duty to help any human being in
need. 52 If the plaintiffs were to check the immigration status

46.
American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thornburgh, 71R F. Supp. R20 (C.D.Cal.
1989), affd, 961 F.2d 1405. The Federal Reporter contains three appellate opinions
entitled American Friends v. Thornburgh: 941 F.2d 80R; 951 F.2d 957; and 961
F.2d 1405.
The third opinion was released on April 20, 1992, and supersedes the previous
two opinions. Its only substantive change consists of a characterization and application of the Supreme Court's holding in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) in terms of a four-part test for evaluating free exercise claims, rather than
in the broader terms in which Smith was characterized in the earlier two opinions.
The Ninth Circuit first enunciated this four-part test in its amended opinion in
NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 129fi, 130fi (9th Cir. 1991) (amended opinion).
8 U.S. C. § 1324a (1988).
4 7.
48.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(a)(1)-1342a(a)(2) (1988).
49.
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (1988).
fiO.
R U.S.C. § 1324a(O (191'18).
fil.
American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 1406
(9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion).
52.
See Thornburgh, 71R F. Supp. at R21 (quoting the plaintiffs' religious belief
in "the sacredness and equality of all human life"; IRWIN ABRAMS, THE NOBEL
PEACE PRIZE AND THE LAUREATES 149 (1988) (referring to the Quaker belief that
every person is endowed with the Inward Spirit of Truth and Love and Goodness,
which should be "translated into action"); (CHRISTIAN CHURCHES OF AMERICA: 0RI-
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of their employees and refuse employment to anyone not authorized to work in the United States, they would in effect rob
them of their ability to feed and clothe themselves, thus adding
to the sum of human misery. 5a The contradiction between the
requirements of I.R.C.A. and the requirements of the plaintiffs'
religious convictions becomes even more apparent when one
learns that the charitable activities of AFSC have their origin
in the Quaker belief that the Inward Spirit of Truth and Love
and Goodness should be translated into action through humanitarian efforts. 54 On the basis of this contradiction between
their religious practices and the law, the plaintiffs sought a
declaration that the employer sanctions provisions of I.R.C.A.
violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. 55 The defendants responded by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 56
To fully understand the clash of interests faced by the
Ninth Circuit in Thornburgh, it is helpful to know something
about the purposes behind I.R.C.A. and the history of AFSC.

2. l.R.C.A.'s purposes
Congressman Mazzoli of Kentucky, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee and one of the leading forces behind
I.R.C.A., listed what he considered to be the central purposes
animating I.R.C.A.
First, to prevent the uncontrolled influx of undocumented
aliens into the United States;
Second, to end the current exploitation of millions of
undocumented aliens who live in a twilight subrosa [sic] society, afraid to come forward, because of their illegal status;
and

<HNS AND BELIEFS, 144 (Milton V. Backman, Jr., 19R:i) (referring to the Quaker
spirit of equality and humanitarianism).
5:3.
Tlwrnburgh, 71R F. Supp. at R21.
54.
Abrams, supra note fi2, at 149 (discussing William Penn's statement that
the Inward Spirit should inspire believers to improve the condition of the world
and reporting that the AFSC representative emphasized the religious grounds for
the AFSC's humanitarian efforts in his Nobel lecture); see NOBEL PRIZE WINNERS,
14-15 (Tyler Wasson, ed. 19R7) (noting the origin of AFSC's humanitarian work in
the Quaker conviction that the Inward Spirit inheres in every person).
5fi.
Tlwrnburgh, 718 F. Supp. at R21.
56.
!d.
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Third, to preserve the humanitarian traditions and generous ideals of this country regarding the admission of legal
immigrants and refugees. 57

Mazzoli further explained how the employers sanctions provisions served the legislative purposes behind I.R.C.A.:
This legislation seeks to close the back door on illegal immigration so that the front door on legal immigration may remain open. The principal means of closing the back door, or
curtailing future illegal immigration, is through employer
sanctions ....
Employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here
illegally or, in the case of nonimmigrants, leads them to accept employment in violation of their status. Employers will
be deterred by the penalties in this legislation from hiring
unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter aliens from
entering illegally or violating their status in search of employment. 58

The end sought by Congress in passing I.R.C.A. was to control
illegal immigration. The means it chose was to require employers to hire and employ only those authorized to work in the
United States. 59 This requirement that employers participate
in the federal immigration scheme ran headlong into AFSC's
long history of religiously-motivated charitable work.

3. AFSC history
The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) was
founded in 1917 by Quakers who wanted to provide opportunities for conscientious objectors to serve in nonmilitary capacities. In 194 7, AFSC, along with the Friends Service Council, a
British Quaker charitable organization, received the Nobel
Peace Prize. 60 During its seventy-five year existence AFSC
has participated in several relief efforts. Following the destruction of World War I it fed the Germans, just as it fed the Rus-

57.
NANCY HUMEL MONTWIELER, THE lMMI<iRAT!ON RE~'ORM LAW OF 1986: ANALYSIS, TEXT, AND LEUISLATIVE HISTORY 4V!-14 (1987).

58.
59.

60.

!d. at 314.
!d.
Abrams, supra note 52, at 148.
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sians during the terrible famine of the early 1920s and assisted
victims of Hitler's antisemitic attacks during the 1930s. 61
More recently, AFSC fed, clothed, and housed the victims of the
1985 Mexico City earthquake. It distributed medicine, clothing,
and other supplies to reduce the suffering of people in Nicaragua and also participated in the controversial sanctuary movement.62
At the time of the Thornburgh litigation AFSC employed
about four hundred people. 63 In accordance with its religious
mission to relieve human need, AFSC has historically made
employment decisions without regard to a person's immigration
status. 64

B.

The District Court Opinion

The district court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the plaintiffs' action with prejudice. 65 The district
court's holding bears repeating at length, because it captures
the reasons why the court dismissed AFSC's suit.
[A]ssuming I.R.C.A. has a substantial impact upon plaintiffs'
free exercise rights as alleged, the plaintiffs' interests cannot
overcome the government's interest in immigration control as a
matter of law. The Court finds, moreover, that plaintiffs cannot
state a claim because a reasonable accommodation for
plaintiffs' religious practice in the form of an exemption to
I.R.C.A. is not feasible .... Granting an exemption to the

61.
Abrams, supra note fi2, at 148. (referring to relief efforts by AFSC before
its receipt of the 1947 Nobel Peace Prize).
62.
Wasson, supra note 54, at 16 (noting the humanitarian efforts of AFSC
during the past decade); Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without
Jury-A novernment's Weapon Against the Sanctuary Movement, lfi HOFSTHA L.
REV. 5, 25 n.106 (1986) (quoting Goldman, U.S. Clerics Debating Ethics of Giving
Sanctuary to Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1985, at A1, col. 3) (listing the churches
and religious organizations who publicly supported the sanctuary movement).
63.
American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 140fi, 1406
(9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion).
64.
See id.
65.
By granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the district court in effect
denied AFSC a full trial on the merits. Instead the court ruled on the basis of the
briefs and the law, and found that the law gave AFSC no basis for its claim. Thornburgh, 718 F. Supp. at 823. By granting the defendants' motion with prejudice
the court barred further litigation by AFSC of its free exercise challenge of I.R.C.A.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (6th ed. 1990).
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plaintiffs would have the effect of reactivating the employment
"magnet" that Congress has endeavored to turn-off by enacting
I.R.C.A. 66 In essence, this holding says that AFSC's free exercise interests, no matter how substantial, could not overcome
the federal government's interest in controlling the flow of
immigration. This decision may seem harsh from AFSC's point
of view, but at least the district court weighed
AFSC's interest in avoiding I.R.C.A. against the federal
government's interest in compelling AFSC to comply with
I.R.C.A. 67 Because the Supreme Court decided Smith after the
district court handed down its judgment but before AFSC could
appeal that judgment,68 AFSC did not receive the benefit of
that balancing test on appeal.

C.

The Ninth Circuit Opinion

AFSC appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the
dismissal, holding that "Smith ... requires rejection of AFSC's
free exercise claim."69
The Ninth Circuit gave three grounds supporting its holding on the free exercise issue. First, I.R.C.A.'s employer sanction provisions are neutral, meaning that they "are not aimed
at suppressing the free exercise of religion." 70 Second, AFSC's
free exercise challenge to I.R.C.A.'s provisions fails to fit within
the hybrid claims doctrine because the free exercise claim is
not accompanied by another "cognizable constitutional
claim.'' 71 Third, I.R.C.A. contains no procedures for granting
individualized exemptions that might give AFSC constitutional
grounds for obtaining a free exercise exemption. 72
The Ninth Circuit found that I.R.C.A. survived the general
rule of Smith, requiring only that a statute not have as its

66.
ld. To see where this language about employment as a magnet for illegal
aliens originated, refer to supra note 58 and accompanying text.
67.
See American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 718 F. Supp. 820,
823 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
Smith was decided April 17, 1990. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
68.
872, 872 (1990). The Ninth Circuit decided Thornburgh August 2, 1991. American
Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 941 F.2d 808, 808 (9th Cir. 1991).
69.
Thornburgh, 961 F.2d at 1409 (emphasis added).
70.
ld.
71.
Id.
72.
ld.
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object the suppression of religious practice. 73 Under the
Sherbert balancing test the court might have gone on to ask
whether I.R.C.A. had the effect of prohibiting the members of
AFSC from practicing their religion. 74 The facts of
Thornburgh intimate the quandary in which AFSC found itself.
Its Quaker members could not satisfy the demands of their
faith without violating I.R.C.A., and vice versa. 75
The Thornburgh court, however, cannot be accused of misapplying precedent. Its application of Smith is probably correct
to a fault. The court read Smith to require only the barest
inquiry into the question whether a statute reveals antireligious bias on its face. 76 The language of the Smith opinion
requires no further inquiry. Unless Congress was imprudent
enough to say that I.R.C.A. marked an attempt to impose a
burden on a particular religion, the statute should survive judicial scrutiny. This is true regardless of whether I.R.C.A. actually burdens the Quakers' religious practice. The obstacle to
AFSC's free exercise challenge lies with the Smith rule itself,
not with the Ninth Circuit's application of it.
The Thornburgh Court's third reason for deciding that
I.R.C.A. did not violate AFSC's free exercise rights was that
I.R.C.A. does not provide for the type of individualized exemptions that the Smith Court identified as an exception to its
general rule. 77 One commentator has defined "individualized
exemptions" in terms of instances when legally-binding decisions are made ad hoc. Such decisions include "zoning,
landmarking, and condemnation decisions." 78 But the
Thornburgh Court may not have read I.R.C.A. as much in favor
of AFSC on this point as it might have done.
Consider, for example, I.R.C.A.'s definition of an "unauthorized alien." Under I.R.C.A. an unauthorized alien is a person who fits into one of two categories: "(A) an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so
employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General." 79 The

n.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(a)(l)-1324a(a)(2) (1988).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
!d. at 884.
Laycock, supra note 4, at 48.
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (1988).
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first category is self-explanatory. The second consists of two
subcategories. The first subcategory consists of aliens authorized to work "by this chapter,"80 which in turn refers to
aliens whom I.R.C.A. legalizes and to agricultural workers who
may obtain a green card after eighteen months' agricultural
work in the United States. The second subcategory refers to
immigration decisions made by the Attorney General. This
second subcategory might have provided AFSC with an exception to the Smith rule.
In Smith the Court wrote, "where the State has in place a
system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend
that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling
reason."81 If I.R.C.A. authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to
make "individual exemptions" based on the particular circumstances of a person's case, the Ninth Circuit might have found
that I.R.C.A. establishes "a system of individual exemptions." If
I.R.C.A. establishes such a system, the Ninth Circuit should
have required the Attorney General, who was, after all, a defendant in Thornburgh, to extend an exemption to AFSC or to
demonstrate a compelling reason why he should not. 82
Having addressed the first and third grounds of the Ninth
Circuit's decision, we turn to the second issue it addressed:
hybrid claims.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HYBRID CLAIMS
DOCTRINE AS APPLIED IN THORNBURGH

A. How the Ninth Circuit Applied the Hybrid Claims
Doctrine in Thornburgh

AFSC argued that its claim was a hybrid of a free exercise
claim and the "right to employ."83 The court refuted that argument by demolishing the "right to employ" component of
AFSC's purported hybrid. 84 It reasoned that "the right to employ" lacked constitutional significance and so could not evade
the central holding of Smith. 85
80.
ld.
81.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
ld.
82.
83.
American Friends Serv. Corum. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 1408
(9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion).
ld.
84.
85.
"There would be little left of the Smith decision if an additional interest of
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The court's reasoning appears to suggest that AFSC might
have succeeded if it had coupled a stronger claim with its free
exercise claim. Counsel for AFSC might have argued for a
hybrid composed of free exercise and free expression claims.
The free expression claim might be asserted because AFSC
employed illegal aliens to express the organization's political
disagreement with Congress's attempt to stop the influx of
illegal aliens. 86 To formulate a free expression claim in this
manner is highly debatable, but it might have been closer to
the truth than the "right to employ" and it has enough plausibility that it might have compelled the AFSC Court to discuss
the hybrid claims doctrine more carefully than it did. Counsel
for AFSC should have known that the "right to employ" would
leave the court an easy out: a wave of the hand, an allusion to
"the Lochner court"87 and AFSC's hybrid claim dies a quick
death. Pointing out this misstep, however, does not resolve the
question of the validity of the hybrid claims doctrine. Should
substantial constitutional claims based on the Free Exercise
Clause hang on such a slim thread as the choice of which constitutional right should accompany a free exercise claim? Could
AFSC have increased its likelihood of success by constructing a
stronger hybrid claim?

B. How the Ninth Circuit's Application of the Hybrid Claims
Doctrine Affected AFSC in Thornburgh
Even after a close reading of Thornburgh, it remains unclear how much the Ninth Circuit's holding on the hybrid
claims issue will affect AFSC. If nothing more, the court's holding makes it more difficult for AFSC to accomplish its religious

such slight constitutional weight as the 'right to hire' were sufficient to qualify for
this [hybrid claims] exception." ld.
86.
Recall that AFSC publicly revealed its participation in the Sanctuary Movement. Colbert, supra note 62, at 5, n.106.
87.
American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 1408
(9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion). This allusion ought to suggest the well-known
fact that asserting anything resembling the "liberty of contract" at issue in Lochner
spells almost certain defeat in federal court, given the general distaste with which
Lochner is viewed. For a survey of the political, economic, and social forces that
caused the demise of Lochner and its style of constitutional adjudication in cases
asserting economic rights, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
578-81 (2d ed. 1991).
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mission. 88 At most the court's holding compels AFSC to refuse
to hire or continue employing illegal aliens. This dissonance
between the religious aims of the organization and the secular
means that the organization may legally use to accomplish
those aims may lead to two consequences for AFSC.
First, the organization now presents a public persona that
runs contrary to a fundamental quality of the Quaker religion:
readiness to relieve suffering. 89 AFSC appears hypocritical by
refusing to employ the same people whom it otherwise reaches
out to help. Some observers may doubt AFSC's commitment to
its own religious mission because I.R.C.A. keeps AFSC from
employing people without regard for their employment status.
Second, the organization's officers and members must
choose between living their religion and staying out of jail. (The
threat of criminal penalties for large employers who engage in
a "pattern or practice" of disobeying I.R.C.A. will surely hang
heavy over any decision that AFSC makes with respect to
I.R.C.A.) 90 Given its prosecutorial discretion, the Justice Department may choose to apply I.R.C.A. to AFSC by assessing
civil sanctions without necessarily initiating criminal prosecutions against AFSC. However defensible, this choice is not
mandated by I.R.C.A. The law allows for criminal prosecution
when an employer exhibits a "pattern or practice" of disobeying
the law. 91 If AFSC chooses to pursue its religious mission in
spite of the law, it will likely find itself the subject of heavy
civil penalties (no small sanction to lay on a charitable organization) and even criminal penalties.

C. Thornburgh Suggests that the Hybrid Claims Doctrine
Provides No Genuine Exception to the Central Holding of
Smith
Given the ease with which the Ninth Circuit dispensed
with AFSC's hybrid claim, one may infer that the court didn't

RR
See Laycock, supra note 4, at 5fi-fi6.
89.
American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 140fi, 1406
(9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion).
.
Compare American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d
90.
1405, 1406 (9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion) with Laycock, supra note 4, at 29-30,
fi7.
91.
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f) (1988).
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read the hybrid claims doctrine as a serious exception to Smith
(a genuine path for plaintiffs to circumvent its holding) at
all. 92 Moreover, as another commentator has noted, "[a] constitutional right that has meaning only when it is combined
with another right would be anomalous."93 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit correctly rejected the plaintiffs' implicit reading of the
hybrid claims doctrine. 94
Instead the court read the hybrid claims doctrine as an
attempt to distinguish precedent. The court read the Smith
opinion's language about hybrid claims and concluded that any
category of hybrid claim other than those explicitly mentioned
by the Smith Court would undermine that case's holding. 95 A
skeptic might say that AFSC failed because its hybrid claim
was so weak. Because the Ninth Circuit read the hybrid claims
doctrine as an attempt to distinguish precedent and not as a
genuine means of evading the core holding of Smith, no hybrid
claim could have survived its scrutiny. In its totality,
Thornburgh suggests that the hybrid claims doctrine provides
only an illusory refuge from the central holding of Smith.
V.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs wishing to assert a claim under the free exercise
clause should not expect much protection by invoking the hybrid claims doctrine. Read carefully, the Ninth Circuit's ruling
in Thornburgh means that the hybrid claims doctrine is a
failed attempt to distinguish flatly contradictory precedent. 96
Understood in this way, the hybrid claims doctrine provides
only an illusory means of circumventing the core holding of
Smith. With the demise of the hybrid claims doctrine as a genuine exception to Smith, religious practice has no constitutional
shelter from the shifting tides of majoritarian will.

Shawn Gunnarson

92.
See also McConnell, supra note 5, at 1122: "[A] legal realist would tell
us . . . that the Smith Court's notion of 'hybrid claims was not intended to be
taken seriously."
9a.
Gordon, supra note 39, at 98.
94.
See American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405,
1408 (9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion).
9fi.
TJwrnburph, 961 F.2d at 1408.
96.
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.

